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Abstract
The Draft Convention on Crimes against Humanity is a welcome
initiative. To ensure that the Convention will reflect developments
under international law since the 1990’s, it is suggested to reconsider
the Draft Convention’s methodology of relying exclusively on the
definition of crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. It is therefore proposed to view the
Rome Statute’s list of crimes as a benchmark for negotiations rather
than as the ultimate text defining what constitutes crimes against
humanity.
In that context, the article advocates for introducing in the Draft
Convention a new crime against humanity addressing widespread or
systematic attacks against cultural heritage. Such attacks have
unfortunately become a rampant phenomenon in both times of war and
peace. In recent decades, a significant evolution in this field has taken
place, including in the discourse equating heritage with humanity and
heritage destruction with attacks against humankind; the jurisprudence
of international tribunals; and the role exercised by bodies such as the
Security Council in support of heritage protection. Notwithstanding
those developments, the legal framework governing atrocity crimes has
not evolved in a commensurate manner. Consequently, certain legal
gaps persist and the expressive value of counter-messaging large-scale
campaigns of destruction has not been fully explored.
The article begins with a brief overview of the contemporary
international criminal law regime governing attacks against cultural
heritage. It continues by identifying the main legal gaps as well as
additional considerations that support the introduction of a distinct
crime against humanity in the Draft Convention’s list of crime. The
article then defines the proposed new crime and analyzes the crime’s
elements including a definition of cultural heritage for the purpose of
the Draft Convention.

I. Introduction
In 2001, the Taliban stunned the international community by
destroying the Bamiyan Buddhas, 2 two monumental statues carved into
the cliffs of the Bamiyan valley in Afghanistan around the 5th century.3
2.

Ahmed Rashid, After 1,700 Years, Buddhas Fall to Taliban Dynamite,
TELEGRAPH
(Mar.
12,
2001),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/132606
3/After-1700-years-Buddhas-fall-to-Taliban-dynamite.html
[https://perma.cc/VD6D-3LWJ].

3.

Id.
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This abominable act was part of a widespread Taliban-led campaign of
destruction of important cultural relics, a phenomenon often referred to
as iconoclasm. 4
Statements, declarations, and resolutions adopted following the
destruction highlighted the impact of such acts on humankind and the
international community as a whole. 5 Similar reactions followed the
attacks carried out by terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Ansar
Dine. 6 Thus, for example, in the context of the Al Mahdi case before
the International Criminal Court (ICC), which addressed destruction
by Ansar Dine of cultural heritage in Timbuktu, Mali, the ICC
Prosecutor noted that “[T]he destruction of religious and historical
World Heritage sites in Timbuktu appears to have shocked the
conscience of humanity,” 7 and the Court stated that the destruction of
international cultural heritage “is an irreplaceable loss that negates
humanity.” 8
Notwithstanding the evolution in the discourse equating heritage
with humanity and heritage destruction with attacks against
humankind, the legal framework governing atrocity crimes has not
evolved in a commensurate manner. Under international criminal law
(ICL), destruction of cultural heritage has remained within the confines
of traditional categories, notably as a war crime, as a form of the crime

4.

Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of
Destroying Cultural Heritage During Peacetime, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 183,
192 (2003) (defining iconoclasm as the “destruction of icons due to the
belief that the images are imbued with an unacceptable symbolic
significance”).

5.

Cf. UNESCO, Resolution on the Protection of the Cultural Heritage of
Afghanistan, Doc. No. WHC-01/CONF.208/23, at 12 (Oct, 30–31, 2001)
(adopted by the General Assembly of State Parties to the World Heritage
Convention at its thirteenth session) (condemning the willful destruction
of the cultural heritage by the Taliban as “crime[s] against the common
heritage of humanity”). See also Wangkeo, supra note 4; Roger O’Keefe,
World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the International Community as
a Whole?, 53 Int’l Comp. L. Q. 189, 200, n. 76 (noting that the United
States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, decried the demolition of the
Buddhas as “a crime against humankind”).

6.

See, e.g., Anissa Barrak, Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi: “I Plead Guilty”,
UNESCO COURIER, at 18 (Oct.–Dec. 2017).

7.

Int’l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Mali, Article 53(1)
Report,
¶
157
(Jan.
16,
2013),
https://www.icccpi.int/itemsDocuments/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicReportENG16Jan20
13.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BHC-ZKPJ].

8.

Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236,
Reparations Order, ¶ 22 (Aug. 17, 2017), available at https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_05117.PDF
[https://perma.cc/KFU7AGTA].
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against humanity of persecution, or an indicator of a genocidal act.9
Consequently, certain legal gaps persist, for instance where acts of
destruction committed during peacetime do not target an identifiable
group and hence do not amount to the crime of persecution.
Moreover, the current legal regime is based on a conservative
paradigm viewing crimes against cultural heritage as crimes against
property, 10 whereas a more nuanced approach would place such crimes
at the intersection between crimes against property and crimes against
people. Existing law also fails to reflect recent developments such as
the interventions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in
support of heritage protection, and it ignores the expressive value of
counter-messaging the iconoclasm phenomenon. 11
Criminalization has therefore lagged behind the rhetoric and has
failed to recognize attacks against cultural heritage as an independent
crime with severe impact on the international community, indeed as a
crime against humanity.
The negotiations of the Draft Convention on Crimes against
Humanity12 serve as an opportunity to close the gap. To that end, this
article proposes to reconsider the Draft Convention’s methodology of
relying exclusively on the definition of crimes against humanity under
the Rome Statute of the ICC, 13 and to view the Rome Statute’s list of
crimes as only a benchmark for negotiations. It further suggests
introducing a new crime against humanity dedicated to attacks against
cultural heritage.
The article begins with a brief overview of the contemporary ICL
regime governing attacks against cultural heritage. It continues by
identifying the main legal gaps and additional considerations that
support the recognition of such attacks as a stand-alone crime against
humanity. The article then defines the proposed new crime and analyzes
the crime’s elements including a definition of cultural heritage for the
purpose of the Draft Convention.
II. The contemporary international criminal law regime governing
attacks against cultural heritage
9.

See Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime
Against Property or a Crime Against People?, 15 J. MARSHALL R. INTELL.
PROP. L. 336, 346 (2016).

10.

Id. at 381.

11.

See UN Security Council Adopts Historic Resolution for the Protection
of
Heritage,
UNESCO
(Mar.
24,
2017),
https://en.unesco.org/news/security-council-adopts-historic-resolutionprotection-heritage [https://perma.cc/8QQR-ZCSP].

12.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Seventy-Fourth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/74/10, at 11–140 (2019) [hereinafter Draft Convention].

13.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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Under ICL, accountability for crimes affecting cultural heritage 14 is
chiefly provided for under the respective rubrics of war crimes and
crimes against humanity. 15 Whereas the former category provides
‘direct protection’ by explicitly criminalizing conducts targeting
cultural heritage, 16 the latter provides only ‘indirect protection’ 17 as
currently no crime against humanity mentions cultural heritage. Under
the third rubric of ICL, namely that of genocide, “cultural genocide” is
not, by itself, recognized as falling within the crime’s definition under
the Genocide Convention 18 or the statutes of international tribunals. 19

14.

Different conventions and other legal instruments use the terms “cultural
property,” “cultural heritage,” or, in some cases, both. It appears that the
term “cultural property” is more legalistic, and is usually associated with
tangible property, whereas “cultural heritage” is more encompassing and
includes also intangible heritage. It was noted that the word “heritage”
“has come to be preferred because it implies that the object should be
cherished and preserved.” See Wangkeo, supra note 4, at 188; see also
Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural
Property’?, 1 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 307, 312 (1992)
(concluding that it is time for law and lawyers to recognize that the term
“cultural heritage” has rightfully superseded that of “cultural property”).
The approach that opts for the use of the term “cultural heritage” is also
reflected in the more recent conventions adopted under the auspices of
UNESCO, namely those governing underwater cultural heritage (2001),
intangible cultural heritage (2003), and the diversity of cultural
expressions (2005). For the purpose of this article, the preferred term
would be “cultural heritage,” though the term “cultural property” will be
occasionally used, in particular where conventions which use this term are
referenced.

15.

Roger O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property Under International
Criminal Law, 11 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 339, 341 (2010) [hereinafter
O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property].

16.

See Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed
Conflict: The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 10–28 (2001) (discussing
the differences between “direct” and “indirect” protection).

17.

See id.

18.

See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, U.N. G.A. Res.
260, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 179th plen. mtg. at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).

19.

Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001) (pointing out that “where there
is physical or biological destruction there are often simultaneous attacks
on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group
as well, attacks which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an
intent to physically destroy the group”); O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural
Property, supra note 15, at 388–89..
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A.

Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as War Crimes

Attacks against cultural heritage in the context of an armed conflict
(be it of an international or non-international character) are considered
as a serious violation of international humanitarian law (IHL) and fall
within the jurisdiction of some international tribunals. 20 The seriousness
of the crime has been recognized by the ICTY 21 and more recently by
the ICC in the Al-Mahdi case. 22
Notably, while cultural heritage may enjoy the general protection
provided to civilian property under IHL, it has been recognized that
during an armed conflict, cultural heritage is also granted an additional
layer of protection. 23 Within the category of protected cultural heritage,
certain designated heritage enjoy ‘special protection’ or ‘enhanced
protection’ during an armed conflict, 24 though it appears that even the

20.

See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8, ¶ 2; Updated Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 3, Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Sept. 2009), available at
https://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_827_199
3_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/75HM-CPQF] [hereinafter ICTY Statute].

21.

See Abtahi, supra note 16; see Theodor Meron, The Protection of the
Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict Within the CaseLaw of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Remarks at the UNESCO Symposium On The 50th Anniversary Of The
1954 Convention For The Protection Of Cultural Property In The Event
Of Armed Conflict (May 14, 2004); Serge Brammertz et al., Attacks
Against Cultural Heritage as a Weapon of War: Prosecutions at the
ICTY, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1143 (2016).

22.

See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor,
ICC Office of the Prosecutor and UNESCO Sign Letter of Intent to
Strengthen Cooperation on the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Nov. 6,
2017),
available
at
https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=171106_OTP_Unesco
[https://perma.cc/34FH-23ZG].

23.

Cf. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 89–90
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004); Meron, supra
note 21, at 5 (describing the choice of the ICTY to address attacks against
cultural property through Art. 3(d) of the ICTY Statute rather than Art.
2(d), which concerns extensive destruction and appropriation of general
civilian property, and noting that this preference of the Tribunal “may,
therefore, be viewed as a welcome development from the standpoint of
safeguarding cultural property, because it affords that property a higher
degree of protection”); Brammertz et al., supra note 21, at 1152–53
(explaining that “Article 3(d) ICTY Statute is a more specific crime
addressing attacks against cultural property as a subset of civilian objects,
reflecting the recognition that cultural property has significance
additional to other civilian objects”).

24.

See The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter
1954 Convention]; The Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the
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more elevated level of protection does not grant absolute immunity
from an attack. 25
B.

Attacks Against Cultural Property as a Crime Against Humanity of
Persecution

The Nuremberg Charter and the ensuing trials, where German
Nazis were convicted for plunder, are considered the first true
international enforcement of protection of cultural property. 26 The
International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg held that the
unlawful destruction and plunder of cultural property amounted not
only to war crimes but also to crimes against humanity. 27

protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26,
1999 [hereinafter 1999 Protocol].
25.

Under existing IHL, all types of cultural heritage – including sites of the
greatest importance to humanity, would be subject to the military
necessity doctrine and hence would not enjoy absolute immunity in the
context of an armed conflict. Both the “special protection” regime of the
1954 Convention and the “enhanced protection” regime of its 1999
Protocol enable parties to an armed conflict to invoke the military
necessity exception, though subject to stricter conditions. See 1954
Convention, supra note 24, art. 11; 1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 13.
With regard to the negotiations over the latter, some Parties to the
Convention expressed the view that a small number of cultural properties,
due to their exceptional value, should remain untouched in any
circumstances; this view, however, was not favored by the majority. See
ROGER O’KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED
CONFLICT 271 (2006). Under the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, the provisions relevant to the protection of cultural
heritage do not make a reference to any waiver of immunity; however,
these provisions are stated to be without prejudice to the 1954
Convention. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 53, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered
into force Dec. 7, 1978); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 16, June 8, 1977, 1125
UNTS 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978). As noted by the ICTY Trial
Chamber, “this suggests that in these respects, the Additional Protocols
may not have affected the operation of the waiver provision of the Hague
Convention of 1954 in cases where military necessity imperatively requires
waiver.” Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 309 (Jan. 31, 2005); see also Brammertz et al., supra note
21, at 1156–57.

26.

See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & JAMES A. R. NAFZIGER, PROTECTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW I 949, 954 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2nd ed. 1999).

27.

International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences,
41 AM. J. OF INT’L. L. 172, 249 (1947); see also O’Keefe, Protection of
Cultural Property, supra note 15, at 380.
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The ICTY, in a series of decisions, has concluded that destruction
of or extensive damage to cultural heritage, when perpetrated with
discriminatory intent, can, as a matter of customary international law,
amount to the crime against humanity of persecution under Article 5(h)
of the ICTY Statute. 28
Though the ICC has not yet rendered a similar decision, it is worth
noting that the crime of persecution under the Rome Statute and the
Draft Convention is broader than that of the ICTY Statute. 29 It also
covers persecution on cultural grounds as well as other grounds that
are universally recognized as impermissible under international law. 30
In principle, it appears that acts against cultural heritage akin to those
which served as a basis for prosecution before the ICTY would likely
be considered as persecution also under the Rome Statute and similarly
under the Draft Convention. 31

III. The Main Legal Gaps
A.

Destruction of Cultural Heritage During Peacetime

Notwithstanding the significant developments in relation to the
protection of cultural heritage during peacetime, 32 aspects of
enforcement and criminal sanctions have been relatively less developed
in comparison to the legal regime governing wartime illegal activities.
Whereas IHL conventions and statutes of international tribunals
explicitly provide for individual criminal responsibility for attacks
against cultural heritage during an armed conflict, 33 there is currently
no international treaty that criminalizes similar acts committed outside
the scope of an armed conflict. Only two of the main conventions that
apply in peacetime, namely the 1970 Convention and the 2001
Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention, make a general reference to
28.

See generally, O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 15;
Brammertz et al., supra note 21, at 1160–70.

29.

See generally, O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 15;
Brammertz et al., supra note 21; see also Draft Convention, supra note
12, at 12.

30.

Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(1)(h); Draft Convention, supra note
12, at 12.

31.

But note some differences between the ICTY Statute, on the one hand,
and the Rome Statute and the Draft Convention, on the other, notably
the required link under the Rome Statute between the crime of
persecution and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC,
mentioned in the following section. See THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 375–76 (Cassesse et
al. eds., 2002).

32.

See discussion infra Section IV(E)(1).

33.

1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 15; Rome Statute, supra note 13, art.
8(2)(b)(ix); ICTY Statute, supra note 20, art. 3(d).
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the imposition of sanctions for violations of the conventions.34
Currently, no convention details the offences to be incorporated under
national law in a manner similar to the one provided for under the 1999
Protocol. 35 The 2017 Council of Europe Convention on Offences relating
to Cultural Property aimed at addressing this gap by listing offences to
be incorporated in national legislation. 36 However, as of today, the
Convention is yet to enter into force. 37
Under customary international law, crimes against humanity are
banned whether they are committed in times of war or peace. 38
Considering that damage to cultural heritage can be deliberately
inflicted without constituting a military attack, viewing destruction of
cultural heritage as a crime against humanity would significantly
contribute to bridging this gap by providing ‘direct protection’ 39 to
cultural heritage in a manner similar to the protection provided under
IHL. 40 It will ensure a consistent criminalization approach, 41 prevent

34.

See Convention on the Means Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 8,
10, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S 231 [hereinafter 1970 Convention]
(requiring State Parties to impose penalties or administrative sanctions
on persons responsible for certain violations of the Convention);
Convention of the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage art 17,
Nov. 2, 2001, U.N.T.S. 2562.

35.

1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 15.

36.

Council of Europe Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property
art. 3–16, May, 19, 2017, 19 E.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Nicosia Convention].

37.

Id.

38.

THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 356; Draft Convention, supra note 12, at
13.

39.

See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity Sixty-Seventh
Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/680, at 6 (Feb. 17, 2015) (“While some
treaties address offences, such as State-sponsored torture or enforced
disappearance of persons, which under certain conditions might also
constitute crimes against humanity, those treaties do not address crimes
against humanity as such.”).

40.

See generally 1999 Protocol, supra note 24.

41.

See Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime
Against Property or a Crime Against People? 15 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 390 (2016) (“The failure in the past to recognize
this obligation to protect cultural heritage was largely the result of the
bifurcation of the treatment of cultural heritage between the law of armed
conflict treaties and those that deal with peacetime threats. This false
dichotomy needs to be superseded.”). See also Michael A. Newton &
Michael P. Scharf, Terrorism and Crimes Against Humanity, in FORGING
A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 262–78 (Leila Nadya
Sadat, ed., 2011) (arguing that expanding the corpus of crimes against
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impunity for acts such as the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, and
align ICL with the customary norm concerning the protection of
cultural heritage. 42
B.

Legal Challenges in Invoking the Crime of Persecution

Despite the ICTY’s wealth of jurisprudence addressing attacks
against cultural heritage as a form of persecution, invoking this crime
as a basis for prosecution requires surmounting legal hurdles. First,
under both the Draft Convention and the Rome Statute, the acts of
persecution must have been committed in connection to another crime
against humanity, genocide or war crime. 43 Thus, there is no jurisdiction
to prosecute persecution per se. 44 It has been argued that, in practical
terms, the requirement should not prove unduly restrictive, since a
review of historical acts of persecution shows that this crime is
inevitably accompanied by such inhumane acts. 45 However, while that
argument may be accurate in cases of crimes such as murder or torture,
it appears to be less persuasive in reference to destruction of cultural
heritage. 46 A systematic and deliberate destruction of sites of unique
cultural value, conducted by a government outside the scope of an
armed conflict, may not necessarily be in conjunction with any other
serious international crime, thus these acts may go unpunished.
In addition, the ICTY determined that the mens rea element of the
crime of persecution is higher than the one required for ordinary crimes
against humanity, although lower than the one required for genocide. 47
If this approach is adopted by the ICC or by a court applying the Draft
Convention (once adopted and entered into force), the already elevated
threshold for prosecuting crimes against humanity will be higher still.

humanity to include terrorism could provide a harmonized legal
framework applicable both in times of armed conflict and peace).
42.

See discussion infra Section IV(E)(1).

43.

Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(1)(h); Draft Convention, supra note
12, art. 2(1)(h).

44.

It is not necessary, however, to demonstrate that the connecting crime
was committed on a widespread or systematic basis: any instance of
another criminal act under the Rome Statute will suffice, even if it does
not amount to a crime against humanity in its own right. See Darryl
Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference,
93 AM. J. INT’L. L. 43, 53–55 (1999).

45.

Id. at 55.

46.

See generally, id.

47.

See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 636,
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000); Abtahi, supra
note 16, at 28.
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Most importantly, by its very definition persecution targets an
identifiable group or collectivity. 48 However, iconoclastic acts target
cultural relics due to the message they convey (in the eyes of the
perpetrator) and often in defiance of values respected by the
international community, not necessarily with an intent to affect any
particular group which cherishes the icons for religious or other
reasons. 49
Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that the three prime
examples of large scale acts of iconoclasm committed in the past 20
years by terrorist groups--namely by the Taliban in Afghanistan, the
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and Ansar Dine in Mali--were intended
to target an identifiable group or collectivity as such. 50
For example, when Ansar Dine took over Timbuktu, its leaders
reportedly announced that “not a single mausoleum will remain in
Timbuktu”, explaining that “Allah doesn’t like it”. 51 As later described
by Al Mahdi in an interview conducted following his conviction by the
ICC, the mission of the Ansar Dine group which he was heading was
to combat all acts that, in the group’s view, contravened the precepts
of Islam. 52 As he explained, the group considered the mausoleums of
Timbuktu to be the incarnation of such acts of heresy. 53
Though those acts of destruction undoubtedly affected the local
community of Timbuktu, as was also recognized by the ICC in the Al
Mahdi Reparations Order, it does not appear that the acts were
conducted with the discriminatory intent to target the local community
48.

The crime, as defined under both the Rome Statute and the Draft
Convention, concerns “Persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity.’’ The term “persecution” is defined under the Rome Statute
and the Draft Convention as “the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity
of the group or collectivity.” Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(2)(g);
Draft Convention, supra note 12, art. 2(2)(g).

49.

See Filipa Vrdoljak, The Criminalisation of the International Destruction
of Cultural Heritage, in FORGING A SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACH TO
ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS (Tiffany Bergin & Emanuela Orlando eds., 2017)
(“Often the monuments, sites and shrines are not directly related to the
cultural and religious practices of present-day inhabitants; instead, they
are evidence of the multi-layered history and diversity of these sites. It is
this cultural and religious diversity which the perpetrators find abhorrent
and seek to expunge through such acts.”).

50.

Id.

51.

Timbuktu
Mausoleums
‘Destroyed,’
BBC
(Dec.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20833010
[https://perma.cc/2Z5S-AU2G].

52.

See Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi: “I plead guilty,” UNESCO,
https://en.unesco.org/courier/2017-october-december/ahmad-al-faqi-almahdi-i-plead-guilty [https://perma.cc/ARB7-QXQE].

53.

Id.

297

23,

2012),

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as a Crime Against Humanity

or the broader population of Mali as such, namely as a form of
persecution
committed
against
these
identifiable
groups.
Unsurprisingly, the prosecution in the Al Mahdi case decided early on
to abandon the investigation of crimes against humanity, stating that
the information available does not provide a reasonable basis to believe
that crimes against humanity under Article 7 have been committed in
the Situation in Mali. 54 It is unlikely that the ICC-OTP’s decision
derived from a conclusion that the acts themselves were not severe
enough – after all, the ICTY recognized similar acts, sometimes against
less known heritage, 55 as amounting to persecution. Rather, it seems
that the decision was based on the conclusion that the specific elements
of the crime of persecution (or that of the crime of “other inhuman
acts” as mentioned below) have not been met. 56
C.

Legal Challenges in Invoking the Crime of “other inhuman acts of
similar character”

An alternative route for prosecuting perpetrators for crimes against
humanity under the Rome Statute or the Draft Convention is found in
the provision which criminalizes “other inhuman acts of a similar
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body
or to mental or physical health.” 57 This residual provision can
potentially provide a solution to the problems discussed in reference to
the crime of persecution such as the required connection to other crimes
or the need to prove a discriminatory intent.
Nonetheless, invoking this crime is not without difficulties. The
crime’s vagueness and open-ended nature will require interpretation by

54.

Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Ct., Situation in Mali: Article 53(1)
Report, ¶ 58, (Jan. 16, 2013), available at https://www.icccpi.int/itemsDocuments/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicReportENG16Jan20
13.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RLL-6Q79]. But see Sebastian A. Green
Martinez, Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Northern Mali, 13 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 1073, 1074 (2015) (criticizing the ICC-OPT’s decision not to
prosecute Al Hahdi for the crime of persecution).

55.

The ICTY’s recognition that destruction against cultural heritage may
amount to persecution was often based on widespread attacks against
religious and cultural institutions that were not inscribed on any list of
heritage of great importance and arguably would not have met the criteria
for such inscription. In comparison, most sites in Timbuktu were inscribed
on the World Heritage list at the time they were attacked. See generally,
World Heritage List, UNESCO https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/
[https://perma.cc/FPC6-7PN3].

56.

Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(2)(g); Draft Convention, supra note
12, at 13.

57.

Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(1)(k); Draft Convention, supra note
12, art. 2(1)(k).
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courts on a case-by-case basis, 58 and in that context might invite
defense arguments on violation of fundamental principles of criminal
law such as nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege and the prohibition
of ex post facto law. 59
To counter the arguments, it may be recalled that the crime of
“other inhuman acts” has been a recognized crime against humanity
since its incorporation into the Nuremberg Charter, 60 and that
confiscation, pillage and plunder of property were considered by the
IMT as “other inhuman acts”. 61 However, the convictions by the IMT
focused on acts committed against a specific population 62 (the Jewish
one), and can therefore be viewed as a form of persecution against an
identifiable group, even if this was not pronounced as such in the IMT’s
judgements.
It is also noteworthy that the residual crime speaks of ‘acts of a
similar character’: Considering that all other crimes enumerated under
Article 2 of the Draft Convention concern acts directly targeting human
persons and often focus on a specific group of victims (e.g. a racial or
ethnic group), crimes concerning cultural heritage, which impact the
international community as a whole, might not be considered as ‘acts
of similar character’. 63 The combination of the above arguments entails
that courts might be reluctant to accept a sufficiently broad
58.

Both the ICTY and the ICTR stressed that the decision whether the
alleged perpetrator’s conduct rose to the level of inhumane acts should be
determined on a case-by-case basis. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case
No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 151 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda May
21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 117
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004).

59.

See Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, The Rome Statute and Captain
Planet: What Lies between ‘Climate against Humanity’ and the ‘Natural
Environment?,’ 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 269 (2009) (suggesting
not to criminalize environmental wrongs by means of interpreting Article
7(l)(k) of the Rome Statute in light of this principle). See also Newton &
Scharf, supra note 41, at 275–76; Rome Statute, supra note 13, at art.
22(2) (“The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not
be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be
interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or
convicted.”).

60.

Newton & Scharf, supra note 41, at 276

61.

Matthew Lippman, Crimes Against Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.
J. 171, 201 (1997).

62.

See generally, id.

63.

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 564–66,
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000) (pointing out
the difficulties in interpreting Article 7(1)(k) of the ICTY Statute in light
of the application of the ejusdem generis rule of interpretation, according
to which a general expression would cover actions similar to those
specifically provided for)..

299

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as a Crime Against Humanity

interpretation that recognizes attacks against cultural heritage as
falling within the scope of Article 1(k). 64 The aforementioned decision
of the ICC-OTP not to prosecute Al Mahdi for crimes against humanity
despite the recognition of the gravity of the crimes, supports the
conclusion that this provision does not serve as an ideal legal basis for
prosecution of serious crimes committed against cultural heritage. 65
D.

Addressing State Responsibility

One of the gaps derived from the absence of a global treaty on
crimes against humanity is that of state responsibility, because the
definition of crimes against humanity is uncertain and no
compromissory clause exists to permit litigation before the
International Court of Justice (or elsewhere) regarding their
commission. 66
This shortcoming is evident in the context of crimes committed
against cultural heritage: few legal instruments governing the
protection of cultural heritage make an explicit reference to state
responsibility 67 or contain a settlement of dispute clause similar to
Article IX of the Genocide Convention. 68 Consequently, there have been
few cases that addressed state responsibility in relation to attacks
against cultural heritage, 69 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
64.

Draft Convention, supra note 12, art. 2(1)(k).

65.

Martinez, supra note 54, at 1074.

66.

See Leila Nadya Sadat, A Contextual and Historical Analysis of the
International Law Commission’s 2017 Draft Articles for a New Global
Treaty on Crimes Against Humanity, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 685
(2018).

67.

Contra 1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 38 (“No provision in this
Protocol relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the
responsibility of States under international law, including the duty to
provide reparation.”); UNESCO Res. 32 C/Res. 1517, at § VI (Oct. 17,
2003) [hereinafter 2003 UNESCO Declaration] (“A State that
intentionally destroys or intentionally fails to take appropriate measures
to prohibit, prevent, stop, and punish any intentional destruction of
cultural heritage of great importance for humanity, whether or not it is
inscribed on a list maintained by UNESCO or another international
organization, bears the responsibility for such destruction, to the extent
provided for by international law.”).

68.

Contra Underwater Cultural Heritage, supra note 35, at art. 25; U.N.
Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Convention on the Protection
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, preamble (Oct.
20,
2005),
https://en.unesco.org/creativity/sites/creativity/files/passeportconvention2005-web2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K44B-48W4] [hereinafter
Cultural Diversity Convention].

69.

A noteworthy exception is the case of “the Stela of Matara,” where a
Claims Commission adjudicated a dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
The case concerned the destruction of an obelisk that is perhaps about
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has not been utilized for cases of heritage destruction which were
previously recognized by international criminal tribunals (e.g. the
attacks against Dubrovnik addressed by the ICTY) in a manner similar
to the cases it adjudicated in relation to genocidal acts. 70
This deficiency as well as the one identified in the previous section,
namely the relative lack of criminal sanctions in the conventions
governing protection of cultural heritage during peacetime, can perhaps
be explained by the fact that cultural heritage conventions and other
instruments often focus on the creation of mechanisms to promote
cultural heritage, for example through the World Heritage List of the
1972 Convention Concerning Protection of World Cultural Property
and Natural Heritage, 71 rather than on addressing criminal or statesponsored illegal activity. Be that as it may, this weakness in the legal
regime may expose cultural heritage to acts of destruction that may go
unpunished and perpetuate impunity of perpetrators and lack of
accountability of states.

IV. Beyond the Legal Gaps: The Case for Recognizing
Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as a Crime
Against Humanity
The previous section identified a number of shortcomings under the
contemporary international legal framework governing protection of
cultural heritage including under the rubric of crimes against humanity.
But beyond the need to address those legal gaps, there are additional
convincing reasons to introduce, in the Draft Convention, a distinct
crime against humanity related to attacks against cultural heritage.
Indeed, the mere fact that unlawful conduct can be covered under
existing criminal offences has not prevented the development of ICL
through the recognition that such a conduct deserves its own definition
as a crime. For example, heinous genocidal acts committed during
WWII were prosecuted under the rubrics of war crimes and crimes

2,500 years old and was of great historical and cultural value for Eritrea.
The destruction was carried out by the Ethiopian armed forces that
occupied part of Eritrea during the war between the countries. See J.
Romesh Weeramantry, Prisoners of War (Eritrea v. Ethiopia), Eritrea’s
Claim 17/Ethiopia’s Claim 4, Partial Awards: Central Front (Eritrea v.
Ethiopia), Eritrea’s Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22/Ethiopia’s Claim 2, Partial
Awards, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 465, 465–72 (2005).
70.

See generally Marko Milanović, State Responsibility for Genocide: A
Follow-Up, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669 (2007).

71.

UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage art.17, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151, 27 U.S.T.
37 (entered into force Dec. 17, 1975) [hereinafter 1972 Convention].
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against humanity as defined under the Nuremberg Charter. 72 The main
culprits were punished with the most severe penalties. 73 Thus, from a
strict legal perspective, there was no normative gap. Yet, following the
war, the United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] passed a resolution
recognizing genocide as a separate international crime, 74 and the
Genocide
Convention
was
adopted
shortly
afterwards.75
Notwithstanding the fact that genocidal acts could be punished using
other legal formulas, genocide was introduced as a new term and as a
distinct crime, inter alia to convey the notion of “never again”. 76
In the same vein and as already noted, 77 attacks against cultural
heritage committed during armed conflicts are punishable under the
general offences governing attacks against civilian property.78
Nonetheless, IHL and corresponding ICL norms were developed to
specifically address attacks against cultural heritage during armed
conflicts, thereby underscoring the gravity of the criminal act. 79
In the context of the Draft Convention, the following points are
worth noting upon considering a proposal to introduce a new crime
related to cultural heritage.
A.

Aligning the Law with the Rhetoric

One of the main features of crimes against humanity is their impact
not just upon the immediate victims but also on all humanity. 80 In that
regard, the repercussions of cultural heritage destruction to humanity
and the international community as a whole was recognized as early as
1954, when the following statement was incorporated in the preamble
of the 1954 Hague Convention: “Being convinced that damage to
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to
72.

William A. Schabas, Origins of the Genocide Convention: From
Nuremberg to Paris, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 35, 40–43 (2007).

73.

See generally, id.

74.

G.A. Res. 1st Sess., 55th plen. Mtg. at 96, U.N. Doc. A/RES/96 (Dec. 11,
1946).

75.

See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 18, at 277.

76.

See Mark A. Drumbl, Sixtieth Anniversary of the Genocide Convention:
The Power of a Word, 40 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 97, 114–16
(2009) (discussing the expressive value in introducing the crime of
genocide).

77.

See discussion infra Section II.

78.

1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 4.

79.

Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv).

80.

Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity), First
Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/680, at 12 (Feb.
17, 2015).
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the cultural heritage of all mankind.” 81 In relation to that statement,
the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights noted that
“[W]hile specific aspects of heritage may have particular resonance for
and connections to particular human groups, all of humanity has a link
to such objects, which represent the “cultural heritage of all
[hu]mankind,” to paraphrase the words of the 1954 Hague
Convention.” 82 The 1972 Convention also emphasized the importance
of cultural heritage to humankind. 83
Similar statements were made on various occasions. Thus, for
example, the 2003 UNESCO Declaration recalled “the tragic
destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan that affected the international
community as a whole,” 84 and defined ‘intentional destruction’ for the
purpose of the Declaration as an act intended to destroy cultural
heritage “in a manner which constitutes a violation of international law
or an unjustifiable offence to the principles of humanity and dictates of
public conscience.” 85 In the ICTY Jokic case, the Trial Chamber noted
that “[T]he shelling attack on the Old Town [of Dubrovnik] was an
attack not only against the history and heritage of the region, but also
against the cultural heritage of humankind.” 86 In the Al Mahdi case,
the ICC Prosecutor stated that “[T]he loss was not locally confined.
The magnitude of the loss of such irreplaceable physical embodiment
81.

1954 Convention, supra note 24, preamble (emphasis added).

82.

Karima Bennoune (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights),
Remarks at the Human Rights Council Session 31, Panel: “Destruction of
Cultural Heritage: Contextualizing the Human Rights Aspect with a View
to Prevention or Mitigation,” 1–2 (Feb. 29, 2016) available at
https://studylib.net/doc/17689335/human-rights-council-session-31
[https://perma.cc/9Q4U-J7VK].

83.

Cf. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, at preamble (“Considering that
deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or natural
heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the
nations of the world. [. . . .] Considering that parts of the cultural or
natural heritage are of outstanding interest and therefore need to be
preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole.”).

84.

2003 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 67, preamble.

85.

Id. § II(2) (defining “intentional destruction” as “an act intended to
destroy in whole or in part cultural heritage, thus compromising its
integrity, in a manner which constitutes a violation of international law
or an unjustifiable offence to the principles of humanity and dictates of
public conscience, in the latter case in so far as such acts are not already
governed by fundamental principles of international law”) (emphasis
added).

86.

Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Trial Chamber Judgment and
Sentence, ¶ 51 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18,
available
at
2004),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/miodrag_jokic/tjug/en/jok-sj040318e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HGK5-69DZ].
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of history and culture was felt by the whole of humanity, and at the
expense of future generations.” 87 In its Judgement, the ICC Trial
Chamber echoed this statement by noting that all the sites (but one)
were UNESCO World Heritage sites and, as such, their attack appears
to be of particular gravity as their destruction does not only affect the
inhabitants of Timbuktu, but also people throughout Mali and the
international community. 88 The Court maintained this approach in its
Reparations Order, noting that “[T]he destruction of cultural heritage
erases part of the heritage of all humankind.” 89 In the 2011 Preah
Vihear Case before the ICJ, Judge Cançado Trindade explained that
“the ultimate titulaires of the right to the safeguard and preservation
of their cultural and spiritual heritage are the collectivities of human
beings concerned, or else humankind as a whole”. 90
The various statements all reflect an undisputable notion that links
cultural heritage and humanity. Indeed, humanity comprises more than
the sum of human beings, and is unique by the culture it has developed.
Heritage bonds peoples and serves as the basis for the development of
societies around the world. 91 As was simply put by Gita Sahgal, the
human rights activist, “heritage is humanity.” 92
87.

Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou
Bensouda, Following Admission of Guilt by the Accused in Mali War
Crime Case: “An Important Step for the Victims, and Another First for
the ICC,” INT’L CRIM. CT. (Mar. 24 2016), available at https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=160324-otp-stat-al-Mahdi
[https://perma.cc/774Q-8K38].

88.

Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and
Sentence, ¶ 80 (Sept. 27, 2016).

89.

Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236,
Reparations Order, ¶ 53 (Aug. 17, 2017).

90.

Request for Interpretation of the Judgement of 15 June 1962 in the Case
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Camb. v. Thai.), Separate
Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, 2013 I.C.J. Reports 567, ¶ 114 (Nov.
11).

91.

See Rome Statute, supra note 13, at preamble (“[State Parties to the
Statute…] Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their
cultures pieced together in a shared heritage . . . .”).

92.

Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, ¶ 48, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/31/59, (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights. The Special Rapporteur
reiterated this quote on March 10, 2016 in her Statement at the 31st
session of the Human Rights Council, adding that “[Heritage] is a record
of the genius of human beings, that which we leave behind for the next
generations to mark our path through this world, and quite simply
irreplaceable even in a digital world.” Karima Bennoune: Cultural
Heritage is a Human Rights Issue, UNESCO (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://en.unesco.org/news/karima-bennoune-cultural-heritage-humanrights-issue [https://perma.cc/E2AC-NHYB].
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Attacks against cultural heritage are therefore attacks against the
very foundations of humanity. 93 In essence and by their definition they
constitute crimes against humanity and therefore fall within the scope
of the Draft Convention, which aims at protecting ‘humanity’ and not
only ‘humans’. Inclusion of a dedicated crime concerning cultural
heritage in the Draft Convention would therefore enable bridging the
gap between the law and the long-standing rhetoric which has equated
heritage with humanity.
B.

Counter-Messaging the “Bamiyanization Phenomenon”

Iconoclasm is unfortunately not a new phenomenon. 94 However, in
the past 20 years, the international community has witnessed a new
wave of deliberate destruction, combined with media campaigns of
terrorist groups which spread the images as part of their strategy. 95 The
Taliban’s “success” in destroying the Bamiyan Buddhas has been
replicated by ISIS in Palmyra and Ansar Dine in Timbuktu. 96 As stated
by the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, “[T]his
represents a form of cultural warfare being used against populations,
and humanity as a whole.” 97
Putting crimes against cultural heritage on par with other serious
crimes would therefore be timely as it will convey an important countermessage to those who intend to engage in iconoclasm. Similar reasoning
93.

See Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-94-14/2-T, Judgment,
¶ 207 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 26, 2001),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/tjug/en/kor-tj010226e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Y7K-7CTK] (holding that destruction of institutions
dedicated to religion “amounts to an attack on the very religious identity
of a people. As such, it manifests a nearly pure expression of the notion
of ‘crimes against humanity,’ for all of humanity is indeed injured by the
destruction of a unique religious culture and its concomitant cultural
objects”).

94.

See George Fitzherbert, Icon Smashing - The Precedents, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 10, 2001) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1211067.stm
[https://perma.cc/V5GA-SW73]; see also Bennoune, supra note 84, at 3
(“Unfortunately, there is a long human history of such acts in all regions
of the world, whether in wars, revolutions or waves of repression.”).

95.

Nasir Behzad & Daud Qarizadah, The Man who Helped Blow up the
NEWS
(Mar.
12,
2015),
Bamiyan
Buddhas,
BBC
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31813681
[https://perma.cc/58AN-EGE3]; Benjamin Isakhan & Jose Antonio
Gonzales Zarandona, Erasing History: Why Islamic State is Blowing up
Ancient Artefacts, THE CONVERSATION (Jun. 4, 2017, 4:23 PM),
https://theconversation.com/erasing-history-why-islamic-state-isblowing-up-ancient-artefacts-78667 [https://perma.cc/UW7H-QHUA].

96.

Id.

97.

Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, supra note
94, ¶ 67. The Special Rapporteur reiterated this statement on February
29, 2016, at her speech before the Human Rights Council. Id.
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was invoked in instances where the international community decided
to restore – to the extent possible – cultural heritage damaged or
destroyed. 98 Thus, for example, at the occasion of restoring the Mostar
Bridge, UNESCO stated: “The old Bridge was destroyed for its
symbolic value. It is for the same reason that UNESCO promised to
rebuild it.” 99 Similarly, in reference to the Bamiyan Buddhas, a
UNESCO representative said: “The world should set an example to
show extremists that today there are possibilities to reconstruct, and
there is the will to reconstruct, such edifices after they are destroyed.”100
The communicative and pedagogical aspect of punishment has been
recognized as a key element of ICL. 101 From an expressivist perspective,
punishment strengthens faith in the rule of law among the general
public and can impede the early indoctrination phases of future
perpetrators. 102 This aspect is particularly pertinent to confronting the
radicalization and indoctrination campaigns characterizing terrorist
groups such as ISIS. 103
Criminalization and providing a legal framework for international
cooperation by including a specific crime against humanity in the Draft
Convention would thus add a crucial dimension to the efforts of the
98.

Rob Smith, 3D-Printing is Helping to Restore the World’s Destroyed
Heritage Sites, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/3d-modelling-is-helping-torestore-the-worlds-destroyed-heritage-sites/
[https://perma.cc/ZQ4VUCK4].

99.

See Press Release, UNESCO, Inauguration of the Mostar Bridge (Jul. 16,
2004),
available
at
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=21743&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
[https://perma.cc/YBB4-FYRZ].

100. Unlike the Mostar Bridge, the restoration of the Buddhas has been met
with significant challenges which, to this date, prevent the
restoration. See Babak Dehghanpisheh, Rebuilding the Bamiyan Buddhas,
NEWS
(Dec.
31,
2001,
6:39
AM),
NBC
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3067334/t/rebuilding-bamiyanbuddhas/#.XQ-ZGsx7mP8 [https://perma.cc/N6CA-DCWT].
101. See Drumbl, supra note 76, at 114–15. For a discussion on the symbolic
function of ICL see Marina Aksenova, Conceptualizing Terrorism:
International Offence or Domestic Governance Tool, 20 J. CONFLICT &
SEC. L. 277, 296 (2015) (“The symbolic function of international criminal
law refers to its mission of creating a space for shared, immutable values
of the international community through the administration of exemplary
justice.”).
102. Id.
103. Much has been written about ISIS’s methods of recruitment and
indoctrination. For an analysis of this phenomenon from a social science
perspective, see Trevor Hawkins, “A Theoretical Analysis of ISIS
Indoctrination and Recruitment,” Capstone Projects and Master’s Theses
(2016), available at https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/caps_thes_all/7
[https://perma.cc/7NMC-A4QJ].
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international community to combat iconoclasm and, more generally, to
advance important goals of ICL.
C.

The Preventative Angle

One of the main objectives of the Draft Convention is the
prevention of crimes against humanity. 104 This aspect is particularly
important with regard to cultural heritage, which is distinguishable
from other forms of property by its irreplaceable character. Various
conventions, resolutions, and court decisions have highlighted this
unique characteristic of cultural heritage. For example, the 1970
Convention requires State Parties to take measures to the extent
feasible to prevent “irremediable injury to the cultural heritage” of a
requesting State. 105 The preamble of the 1972 Convention speaks about
the importance of “safeguarding this unique and irreplaceable property,
to whatever people it may belong.” 106 The UNGA Resolution adopted
after the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas noted that “the
destruction of the statues in Afghanistan, in particular of the unique
Buddhist sculptures in Bamiyan, would be an irreparable loss for
humanity as a whole.” 107 In the ICTY Jokic case, which concerned the
attack against the old town of Dubrovnik, a UNESCO Heritage Site,
the Court noted that “Restoration of buildings of this kind, when
possible, can never return the buildings to their state prior to the attack
because a certain amount of original, historically authentic, material
will have been destroyed, thus affecting the inherent value of the
buildings.” 108 Similarly, in the Al Mahdi case, the Court stated:
“Because of their purpose and symbolism, most cultural property and
cultural heritage are unique and of sentimental value. As a result, they

104. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 26 (“The present draft articles have
two overall objectives: the prevention and the punishment of crimes
against humanity.”). Though the title of the Draft Convention does not
mention the term “prevention”— in comparison to the Genocide
Convention—the preventative angle is emphasized throughout the Draft
Convention. See id. at preamble (“Determined to put an end to impunity
for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the
prevention of such crimes”); id. art. 1 (“The present draft articles apply
to the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity”); id. art.
4. See also Sadat, supra note 66, at 700 (“A core pillar of the Initiative’s
work on crimes against humanity concerned the potential preventive
dimension of a new treaty.”).
105. 1970 Convention, supra note 35, art. 9 (emphasis added).
106. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, preamble (emphasis added).
107. G.A. Res. 55/243, preamble (May 1, 2001) (emphasis added).
108. Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Trial Chamber Judgment and
Sentence, ¶ 52 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18,
2004).
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are not fungible or readily replaceable. The destruction of international
cultural heritage… is an irreplaceable loss that negates humanity.” 109
The importance of preserving unique cultural heritage led the
drafters of conventions in this domain to focus on preventative
measures that State Parties must take to protect cultural heritage. For
example, to safeguard cultural heritage against the foreseeable effects
of an armed conflict, the 1999 Protocol provides that State Parties shall
take, as appropriate, preparatory measures such as the preparation of
inventories and the preparation for the removal of movable cultural
property or the provision for adequate in situ protection of such
property. 110 The 1970 Convention, which, as indicated by its title,
centers on prevention of illicit trafficking of cultural property,
prescribes for measures such as creating national services with qualified
staff, passing laws and regulations governing import, export and
transfer of ownership of cultural property, and establishing and keeping
up to date a list of important cultural property which should not be
exported. 111
The inclusion in the Draft Convention of a specific crime against
humanity in relation to attacks against cultural heritage therefore
corresponds to the preventative approach reflected in other conventions
governing protection of cultural heritage as well as the preventative
aspect of the Draft Convention. It can complement the efforts to
prevent irreparable damage to cultural heritage and consequently to
humanity.
D.

The Rome Statute as a Benchmark

One possible argument against the inclusion of a distinct crime
related to cultural heritage is the decision to rely on the Rome Statute
as the sole and definitive basis for the substantive law of the Draft
Convention. From the outset, the Draft Convention intended to track
the Rome Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity, building
upon the “Rome consensus.’ 112 The current draft reflects this approach:
The preamble recalls “the definition of crimes against humanity as set
forth in article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court”, 113 and art. 2 of the Draft Convention (“Definition of Crimes
against Humanity”) is taken almost verbatim from the Rome Statute.114
109. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236,
Reparations Order, ¶ 22 (Aug. 17, 2017).
110. 1999 Protocol, supra note 36, art. 5.
111. 1970 Convention, supra note 35, art. 5.
112. Sadat, supra note 66, at 696.
113. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 11.
114. Int’l Law Comm’n, Statement of the Chair of the Drafting Committee,
Crimes
Against
Humanity,
at
6
(May
22,
2019),
https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/statements/2019_dc_ch
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This approach undoubtedly has merits, including practical ones: It
avoids the need for lengthy negotiations over the substantive law, thus
focusing on aspects of international cooperation (extradition, MLA
requests, etc.) relevant for combating the crimes listed under art. 2 of
the Draft Convention. 115
Yet, this position deserves reconsideration. A legislative
methodology which is based on maintaining the scope and language of
previous texts for the sake of consensus can create legal challenges for
courts applying the law. 116 For example, the war crimes introduced in
relation to attacks against cultural heritage were based on the Hague
Convention of 1907 on the Laws and Customs of Wars on Land 117 and
consequently have a number of inherent shortcomings. 118 In the Al
Mahdi case, while no doubt arose with regard to his role in destroying
cultural heritage, the conviction was criticized for not meeting all legal
requirements defined under the Rome Statute. 119

airman_statement_cah.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY2W-PGEE] (“The text
adopted on first reading essentially reproduced Article 7 of the Rome
Statute in three consecutive paragraphs, except for three non-substantive
changes, following a general agreement in the Commission that the
definition of crimes against humanity contained in the Rome Statute
should not be modified by the Commission in the context of the work on
this topic.”).
115. For a discussion of the various reasons that may support the use of the
definition of the crimes as provided under the Rome Statute, see Darry
Robinson, The Draft Convention on Crimes Against Humanity: What to
Do with the Definition? (Queen’s Univ., Legal Research Paper No. 2015013, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2531530 [https://perma.cc/6J699UA4], in ON THE DRAFT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY CONVENTION 103,
103–33 (Morten Bergsmo & Song Tianying eds., FICHL Publication Series
No. 18, 2014).
116. An example from a different domain is the definition of maritime piracy
in Article 101 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which
merely duplicated previous texts and was criticized even before the
Convention entered into force. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The New
“Jamaica Discipline”: Problems with Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 127, 128
(1990) (“Ironically, these piracy articles [in UNCLOS] perpetuate defects
in response to maritime violence which . . . . could enable that ‘business’
to thrive.”).
117. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War and Land
Convention art. 27, Oct. 18, 1907, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907
Convention].
118. See generally Yaron Gottlieb, Criminalizing Destruction of Cultural
Property: A Proposal for Defining New Crimes under the Rome Statute
of the ICC, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 857 (2005).
119. See William Schabas, Al Mahdi Has Been Convicted of a Crime He Did
Not Commit, 49 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 75, 101 (2017).
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It is evident that the Rome Statute did not intend to create
stagnation of ICL. Article 10 provides that “Nothing in this Part [Part
II: Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law] shall be interpreted
as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of
international law for purposes other than this Statute.” 120 Article 7,
which governs crimes against humanity, starts with the phrase ‘for the
purpose of this Statute’, which entails that the definition of the crimes
is “plainly intended only to be applicable before the International
Criminal Court.” 121 In relation to this provision it was also noted that
it “represents both a ‘codification’ and a ‘progressive development of
international law’ within the meaning of article 13 of the UN
Charter.” 122
Interestingly, the drafters of the Draft Convention did not consider
themselves bound by the text of the Rome Statute when addressing
aspects other than the definition of the crimes. 123 For example, they
opted for a broader approach on accountability by introducing a
requirement that States take measures, where appropriate, to establish
the liability of legal persons. 124 This welcome approach was adopted
despite the drafters’ recognition that criminal liability of legal persons
is still unknown in many States, that many conventions do not include
this form of liability, and that this approach deviates from the statutes
of most international criminal tribunals. 125
Importantly, the negotiations over the Draft Convention should not
ignore the changes in the landscape on the international level since the
negotiations of the Rome Statute in the 1990’s. Specifically with regard
to cultural heritage and as will be elaborated below, there have been
significant developments in recent decades which justify elevating the
level of protection granted to cultural heritage and viewing widespread
or systematic attacks against cultural heritage as crimes against
humanity. In conclusion, Article 7 of the Rome Statute should serve as

120. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 10.
121. See THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 159 (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3d ed. 2016)
(emphasis in the original text).
122. Id. at 155. See also Wattad, supra note 59, at 275–76 (explaining why the
existing list of crimes under the Rome Statute is not a closed list and
arguing that “. . . . criminal theory is a living institute. A particular
crime’s definition, scope and substance change over time. The history of
the evolution of the core crime is a living testimony on how the meanings
of ‘war crime’ and ‘crimes against humanity’’ for example, have been the
subject of serious changes and development throughout history”).
123. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 22–23.
124. Id. at 14.
125. Id. at 73–75.

310

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as a Crime Against Humanity

a benchmark for the Draft Convention, not as the ultimate text defining
what constitutes crimes against humanity.
E.

Developments in the Past 20 Years in Relation to the Protection of
Cultural Heritage

The norms governing protection of cultural heritage has
significantly developed since the 1990’s, when the Rome Statute was
negotiated. There is little doubt today that attacks against cultural
heritage may entail individual criminal responsibility 126 and that the
governing rules also apply to non-state actors. 127 The following
developments are particularly noteworthy.
1.

Attacks Against Cultural Property as Violation of Customary
International Law

It is by now firmly established that deliberate attacks against
cultural heritage of great importance to humankind constitute a
violation of customary international law, 128 indeed of a norm of an erga
omnes character. 129 Iconoclasm of the type seen in Afghanistan, Syria,

126. See Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Madhi, ICC--01/12-01/15,
Reparations Order (Aug. 17, 2017); Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihasanovic
and Amir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR73.3, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal, ¶ 44 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2005);
UNESCO Declaration on the Destruction of Cultural Heritage, supra note
86, art. 7 (“States should take all appropriate measures, in accordance
with international law, to establish jurisdiction over, and provide effective
criminal sanctions against, those persons who commit, or order to be
committed, acts of intentional destruction of cultural heritage of great
importance for humanity, whether or not it is inscribed on a list
maintained by UNESCO or another international organization.”).
127. See G.A. Res. A/HRC/RES/33/20, preamble (Oct. 6, 2016)
(“Recognizing also that addressing the destruction of tangible and
intangible cultural heritage needs to be holistic, encompassing all regions,
contemplating both prevention and accountability, focusing on acts by
State and non-State actors in both conflict and non-conflict situations,
and terrorist acts”); Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 383 (referring to the
2003 UNESCO Declaration and noting that it applies to destruction
committed by the governing authority within its own territory, as was
the case with the Taliban in Afghanistan).
128. Cf. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, supra
note 92, ¶ 59 (concurring with experts that “‘the prohibition of acts of
deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of major value for humanity’
rises to the level of customary international law and is a norm which is
supported by ‘a general opinio juris.’”).
129. See Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the
Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 633–
34 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he first of these customary norms lies in the
principle according to which cultural heritage constitutes part of the
general interest of the international community as a whole. This principle
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Iraq, and Mali has been strongly condemned by numerous states,
attesting to their opinio juris in relation to such illegitimate acts.130
Under IHL, the conclusion regarding the status of this norm is
reinforced by the inclusion in the Rome Statute of attacks against
certain types of cultural heritage as war crimes subject to the ICC’s
jurisdiction as well as the wealth of ICTY’s jurisprudence. The norm
applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts. 131
The norm against the peacetime destruction of cultural property
has also evolved considerably. The 1972 Convention and the Intangible
Heritage Convention, which created (respectively) the World Heritage
List and the List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, and
which impose on Member States the duty to safeguard cultural heritage
present in their territories, 132 have by now practically universal
membership. 133 The 2003 UNESCO Declaration, adopted unanimously
has its theoretical foundation in the concept of erga omnes obligations . .
. .”).
130. See Filippo Ristoldo, Attacks Against Cultural Property as a Weapon of
War, 34 STUDENT PAPER SERIES 2, 9 (2016); Francesco Francioni, Beyond
State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Shared
Interest of Humanity, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1209, 1219 (2004) (discussing
that an opinio juris regarding the unlawful character of destruction of
cultural heritage also in peace time is emerging).
131. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(2)(b)(ix), 8(2)(e)(iv) (stating that
deliberate attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art,
science or charitable purposes and historic monuments are criminalized
under the Rome Statute in both sections of international and noninternational armed conflicts); 1954 Convention, supra note 24, art. 19
(applying the Convention to “conflicts not of an international character”;
1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 22 (applying the Protocol to “armed
conflicts not of an international character”; Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case
No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 230 (Jan. 31, 2005)
(concluding that Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute, which criminalizes
“seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated
to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic
monuments and works of art and science,” is “a rule of international
humanitarian law which not only reflects customary international law but
is applicable to both international and non-international armed
conflicts”). .
132. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 4; UNESCO, Convention for the
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage art. 11, (Oct. 17, 2003),
available
at
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=17716&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
[https://perma.cc/8FL2-CTG5]
[hereinafter
Intangible
Heritage
Convention].
133. See
UNESCO,
States
Parties
Ratification
Status,
https://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/
[https://perma.cc/85LY4WQK] (stating there are 193 parties to the 1972 Convention); UNESCO,
The
2003
Convention
Reaches
175
State
Parties,
https://ich.unesco.org/en/news/the-2003-convention-reaches-175-state-
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by UNESCO members following the destruction of the Bamiyan
Buddhas, placed on equal footing the protection of cultural heritage
during war and peace times. 134 It has been therefore correctly argued
that by extending similar protections to cultural heritage in the absence
of armed conflict, destruction of cultural heritage during peacetime
“moves beyond the status of a war crime to the level of a crime against
humanity.” 135
This evolution, which supports the conclusion regarding the
elevated status accorded to the norm prohibiting attacks against
cultural heritage, is of importance for the purposes of the Draft
Convention, considering that all crimes currently listed in Art. 2 are
viewed as violations of customary international law.
2.

Security Council Resolutions

Another important development is the growing recognition that
attacks against cultural heritage may constitute a threat to
international peace and security in the meaning of the Charter of the
United Nations. When the Taliban launched its campaign of
destruction of cultural relics, culminating with the demolition of the
Bamiyan Buddhas, various international bodies including the UNGA
and UNESCO expressed their profound concerns. 136 The UNSC’s voice,
however, was not heard, though the Taliban was already subject to
UNSC sanctions. 137 At the time, some scholars explained that this was
due to the fact that the destruction of cultural heritage in itself cannot
be reasonably said to reach the threshold of a ‘threat’ under Article 39
of the UN Charter. 138

parties-00255 [https://perma.cc/G9K7-NVYK] (stating there are 175
parties to the Intangible Heritage Convention).
134. UNESCO Declaration on the Destruction of Cultural Heritage, supra note
86, preamble (“Mindful of the development of rules of customary
international law as also affirmed by the relevant case-law, related to the
protection of cultural heritage in peacetime as well as in the event of
armed conflict”) (emphasis omitted).
135. See Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 383 (suggesting that “the Declaration
may be considered to be an element or evidence of customary
international law”).
136. See G.A. Res. 53/165, ¶ 16 (Dec. 9, 1998) (“Expresses its deep concern
at reports of attacks on and looting of cultural artefacts in Afghanistan .
. . .”). Cf. U.N. Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
Doc. No. WHC-01/CONF.208/23, at 6 (Nov. 22, 2001) (describing
UNESCO Press Release No. 2001-27).
137. See S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4 (Oct. 15, 1999) (reaffirming “respect for
Afghanistan’s cultural and historical heritage”).
138. See Francioni & Lenzerini, supra note 129, at 630.
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Whether this conclusion was accurate when pronounced is
debatable. During the discussion that took place at the UNGA following
the destruction of the Buddhas, a number of delegates linked respect
for cultural and religious differences to peace and stability in the
world. 139 In any event, the ensuing developments in the past (nearly)
two decades suggest that the position expressed by those delegates has
found broader support.
Respect for cultural heritage has been frequently linked to the
notion of peace and security. Thus, for example, the preamble of the
Cultural Diversity Convention recalls that “cultural diversity,
flourishing within a framework of democracy, tolerance, social justice
and mutual respect between peoples and cultures, is indispensable for
peace and security at the local, national and international levels”.140
The UNGA has encouraged activities “aimed at promoting
interreligious and intercultural dialogue in order to enhance peace and
social stability”. 141 The associative value of cultural heritage can also
lead to disputes that may escalate into armed conflicts, hence
threatening international peace and security. For example, the dispute
between Cambodia and Thailand on sovereignty over the Preah Vihear
Temple led, in 2008, to an exchange of fire between the armed forces of
both countries. 142 This required intervention by international bodies
including a second round of discussions before the ICJ, which issued an
order on provisional measures, demanding both countries to withdraw
their military personnel from a “provisional demilitarized zone”
surrounding the Temple. 143
Notably, various Resolutions adopted by the UNSC in the period
that followed the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas attest to the
significant evolution in relation to the nexus between protection of
cultural heritage and the notion of international peace and security. In
2003, the UNSC incorporated in the operative part of a Chapter VII
139. See Wangkeo, supra note 4, at 259 n.632 (“The delegate from Mauritius
believed that international peace and security was ‘based on this fabric of
understanding and mutual respect between nations, as well as respect for
the religions and cultures of all the peoples of the world’ [. . . .] Thailand
implied the same by counting cultural diversity as a bedrock of the United
Nations and its institutions.”).
140. Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 68, preamble. As of May 2020,
the Convention has 148 State Parties. See Convention on the Protection
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=31038&language=E
&order=alpha [https://perma.cc/M6CR-PFUB].
141. G.A. Res. 73/129 (Dec. 20, 2018) (emphasis added).
142. See Q&A: Thailand-Cambodia Temple Dispute, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7,
2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12378001
[https://perma.cc/V7ZD-AU52].
143. See Camb. v. Thai., 2011 I.C.J. at 554.
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Resolution instructions to all UN Member States to take steps to
facilitate the return of Iraqi cultural property to Iraqi institutions,
including by establishing a prohibition on trade in or transfer of
artefacts. 144 In a series of Chapter VII Resolutions, adopted since 2012
in the context of the situation in Mali, the UNSC first recalled that
destruction of cultural and religious sites may amount to crimes under
the Rome Statute. 145 It included, for the first time, protection of cultural
heritage in the mandate of a peacekeeping operation, 146 thus putting it
on par with several other humanitarian and civil protection goals,
including humanitarian assistance and promotion and protection of
human rights. 147 In another novel Resolution, the UNSC also included
the possible imposition of sanctions in relation to attacks against
cultural heritage. 148
In parallel, and acting under Chapter VII, the UNSC condemned
the destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq and Syria by the Islamic
State and the Al-Nusra Front, and noted with concern the established
links between the looting and smuggling of cultural heritage and the
financing of terrorism. 149
This evolution on the UNSC level culminated with the unanimous
adoption in March 2017 of UNSC Resolution 2347, entirely dedicated
to the protection of cultural heritage. 150 In this Resolution, the UNSC
144. See S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 7 (May 22, 2003).
145. See S.C. Res. 2071 (Oct. 12, 2012); Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 385
(describing Resolution 2100, made a few months later, where the UNSC
referred to the “destruction of cultural and historical heritage”, while
omitting specific reference to religious sites, which are presumably
subsumed within the categories of cultural and historical heritage, as a
violation of international humanitarian law).
146. S.C. Res. 2100 (Apr. 25, 2013). The Resolution, which established the
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
(MINUSMA), includes two aspects related to the protection of Cultural
Heritage in MINMUSMA’s mandate: First, to assist the transitional
authorities of Mali in protecting from attack the cultural and historical
sites in Mali. Second, to operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and
historical sites. Cultural heritage preservation was thus put on par with
several other humanitarian and civil protection goals, including
humanitarian assistance and promotion and protection of human rights.
See id. at ¶ 15(f).
147. See Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 385.
148.

S.C. Res. 2374 (Sept. 5, 2017). The Resolution established a new
sanctions committee, which may designate individuals or entities that
undermine the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali by
financing them through the proceeds from organized crime, including
trafficking in drugs, human beings, arms, and cultural property. See id.
at ¶ 9.

149. See S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 15–16 (Feb. 12, 2015).
150. See S.C. Res. 2347 (Mar. 24, 2017).
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emphasized that the unlawful destruction of cultural heritage can fuel
and exacerbate conflict and hamper post-conflict national
reconciliation, thereby undermining the security and stability of
affected States. 151 Statements made by various representatives in the
debate that preceded the adoption of the Resolution all underlined the
importance attached to the protection of cultural property as a security
imperative. 152 For example, the British Ambassador highlighted the
need to respond to cultural destruction “with the same intensity and
the same unity of purpose as any other threat to international peace
and security.” 153 The UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
noted that the protection of cultural heritage “is not only a cultural
issue, it is also a security and humanitarian imperative.” 154
Hence, considering attacks against cultural heritage as potentially
threatening peace and security is no longer a far-fetched concept. This
conclusion is noteworthy in the context of the Draft Convention for two
important reasons: First, since the preamble of the Draft Convention
explicitly recognizes that crimes against humanity “threaten the peace,
security and well-being of the world”. 155 Thus, the list of crimes in
Article 2 should include only those whose commission may indeed pose
risks to peace and security. Second, in light of the fact that when the
Rome Statute was negotiated there was relatively little support for this
view, 156 the evolution in the past 20 years therefore supports the call to
reconsider the decision to include in Article 2 of the Draft Convention
151. Id.
152. See generally Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/Pv.7907 (2017) (detailing the
debate between the representatives preceding the adoption of Resolution
2347).
153. Ambassador Peter Wilson, U.K. Deputy Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, Statement at the Security Council Briefing on Protecting
Cultural
Heritage
(Mar.
24,
2017),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/what-were-witnessing-is-asystematic-and-corrosive-assault-on-history-on-religion-on-the-veryfabric-of-identity [https://perma.cc/Z3UL-L4BH].
154. Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/Pv.7907, at 2 (2017); accord id. at 4
(“defending cultural heritage is more than a cultural issue; it is a security
imperative that cannot be separated from the protection of human lives”).
See also Kristin Hausler, Cultural Heritage and the Security Council:
Why Resolution 2347 Matters (Mar. 31, 2018), available at
http://www.qil-qdi.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/02_UNSCCulturalHeritage_Hausler_FIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5C3-6XMN] (discussing
Resolution 2347 and its impact).
155. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 11. See also Rome Statute, supra
note 13, at 91 (“Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace,
security and well-being of the world.”).
156. See Gottlieb, supra note 118, at 889.
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only the crimes identified in the 1990’s as meeting the threshold of
crimes against humanity.
3.

The Al Mahdi Case: Recognizing the International Community as a
Victim of Cultural Heritage Destruction

The importance of cultural heritage to humankind has been
considered as a factor when assessing the gravity of the crime. 157 The
Al – Mahdi case, which was innovative in a number of aspects, notably
as the first case ever to focus exclusively on the war crime governing
attacks against cultural property, 158 was also groundbreaking in another
dimension: In its Reparations Order, the Court decided to grant one
symbolic euro to the international community. 159
The decision to recognize the international community as a victim
in this case is well-founded on the facts, in particular the intention of
the perpetrators to destroy heritage cherished by the world community.
Various statements, made during and after the destruction of
Timbuktu’s heritage, manifest that the acts of destruction were indeed
aimed at the international community as a whole, as an act of defiance
against the very meaning of civilization. One speaker on behalf of Ansar
Dine told foreign reporters “from now on, as soon as foreigners speak
of Timbuktu” they [Ansar Dine] would attack anything referred to as
a World Heritage site,” adding that “[T]here is no world heritage, it
doesn’t exist.” 160 Similarly, Omar Hamaha, the military chief of Ansar

157. Cf. Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Trial Chamber Judgment
and Sentence, ¶ 53 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18,
2004) (“The Trial Chamber finds that, since it is a serious violation of
international humanitarian law to attack civilian buildings, it is a crime
of even greater seriousness to direct an attack on an especially protected
site, such as the Old Town, constituted of civilian buildings and resulting
in extensive destruction within the site.”). See also Prosecutor v. Ahmad
Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 80
(Sept. 27, 2016) (“Furthermore, all the sites but one (the Sheikh
Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani Mausoleum) were UNESCO World
Heritage sites and, as such, their attack appears to be of particular gravity
as their destruction does not only affect the direct victims of the crimes,
namely the faithful and inhabitants of Timbuktu, but also people
throughout Mali and the international community.”)
158. See Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 387 (“This prosecution for cultural
heritage destruction, divorced from attacks on civilians and other civilian
objects, moves the pendulum toward elevating the status of cultural
heritage destruction as a crime. The Prosecutor emphasized the cultural,
rather than solely the religious value, of the historic structures.”).
159. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236,
Reparations Order, ¶ 107 (Aug. 17, 2017).
160. AFP, Mali Islamists Destroy Tombs at Ancient Timbuktu Mosque, Aʜʀᴀᴍ
(July
10,
2012),
Oɴʟɪɴᴇ
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/9/47361/World/Internatio

317

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as a Crime Against Humanity

Dine, stated that this group “is showing the rest of world, especially
Western countries, that whether they want it or not, we will not let the
younger generation believe in shrines as God, regardless of what the
U.N., UNESCO, International Criminal Court or ECOWAS [the
Economic Community of West African States] have to say. We do not
recognize these organizations.” 161 As also presented during the Al Mahdi
case, “Mr. Al Mahdi said himself during the Djingareyber Mosque
attack: It’s probably the oldest mosque here in town, and is considered
a heritage site […] a World Heritage Site. There are so many rumours
relating to these shrines […]. Those UNESCO jackasses – this […] they
think that this is heritage. Does ‘heritage’ include worshipping cows
and trees?” 162 During his trial, Al Mahdi stated “[I]’m really remorseful
about what I had caused the international community as a whole.” 163
Viewing the international community as a victim, as enunciated for
the first time by an international court with a concrete – even if
symbolic – sanction, is certainly a turning point. Importantly, it has
removed any doubt, if one ever existed, on the fact that all humankind
is impacted by the destruction of cultural heritage. It thus also
represents another step in aligning the law and practice with the longstanding rhetoric on the importance of cultural heritage to humanity.
The holding in the Al-Mahdi case has additional significant
implications: Recognizing that the international community is a victim
of destruction of cultural heritage also entails the possible application
of all criminal jurisdiction paradigms – including universal jurisdiction
– to cases of attacks against cultural heritage. 164 This conclusion is
pertinent in relation to the Draft Convention, which recalls that “it is
the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction with respect
to crimes against humanity” 165, and obliges each state to “take the
necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered
by the present draft articles in cases where the alleged offender is

nal/MaliIslamists-destroy-tombs-atancient-Timbuktu-m.aspx
[https://perma.cc/X5SX-S9SV].
161. Julius Cavendish, Destroying Timbuktu: The Jihadist Who Inspires the
Demolition
of
the
Shrines,
Tɪᴍᴇ
(July
10,
2012),
http://world.time.com/2012/07/10/destroying-timbuktu-the-jihadistwho-inspires-the-demolition-of-the-shrines/
[https://perma.cc/FY3JXTZQ].
162. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, Judgment
and Sentence, ¶ 46 (Sept. 27, 2016).
163. Id. ¶ 70 (emphasis in original).
164. See 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 535 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986)
(discussing the application of criminal jurisdiction in the context of
cultural heritage).
165. Draft Convention, supra note 12, premable.
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present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite
or surrender the person in accordance with the present draft articles.”166
4. Rethinking the Categorization of Crimes Against Cultural Heritage:
The Intersection between Crimes Against Property and Crimes Against
People

Crimes affecting cultural heritage have traditionally been
considered as falling within the category of crimes against property. It
is probably one of the reasons – perhaps the focal one – for not viewing
such conduct as an independent crime against humanity, bearing in
mind that currently all the other crimes against humanity under the
Draft Convention belong to the category of crimes against persons.167
Despite various innovative aspects in the Al Mahdi case, this classic
approach was maintained by the Court, which noted that “unlike other
accused convicted by this Court, Mr. Al Mahdi is not charged with
crimes against persons but with a crime against property. In the view
of the Chamber, even if inherently grave, crimes against property are
generally of lesser gravity than crimes against persons.” 168
This conservative position, however, seems to be at odds with the
Court’s own findings, according to which the destruction of cultural
heritage directed by Al Mahdi does not merely constitute attacks
against property as such but also an affront to important values of
humanity, enshrined in UNESCO’s Constitution. 169
Moreover, this approach fails to acknowledge important
developments under international law, which point to a shift in the
manner by which protection of cultural heritage is perceived. First, as
argued as early as 2001, “[T]he ICTY’s prosecution of cultural property
crimes is also significant because it blurred the traditional distinction
between crimes against persons and crimes against property.” 170 The
rich ICTY jurisprudence that followed that statement confirms this
conclusion. 171
Importantly, there is a growing recognition of the human dimension
of cultural heritage. 172 This is manifested, for example, by the two most
recent conventions adopted under the auspices of UNESCO, namely
166. Id. art. 6(2).
167. Id. art. 2.
168. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, Judgment
and Sentence, ¶ 77 (Sept. 27, 2016).
169. See id. ¶ 46.
170. Abtahi, supra note 16, at 31.
171. See id. (providing an analysis of the ICTY jurisprudence).
172. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236,
Reparations Order, ¶ 16 (Aug. 17, 2017) (“Cultural heritage is important
not only in itself, but also in relation to its human dimension.”).
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the 2003 Convention on Intangible Heritage and the 2005 Convention
on Cultural Diversity. 173 Both Conventions are centered on the links
between cultural heritage and communities and even individuals. 174
These developments and shift of mindset place crimes against
cultural heritage at the intersection between crimes against property
and crimes against people. Where cultural heritage concerns tangible
property such as historic monuments, the immediate target may be the
particular property, yet the impact on the human dimension, indeed on
humanity as a whole, cannot and should not be ignored. Where the
target is intangible heritage, the human aspect is inevitably intertwined
with such acts. Either way, cultural heritage destruction may no longer
be considered as a simple loss of property. 175

V. The Offence
In light of the foregoing discussion and for the purpose of the Draft
Convention, 176 it is proposed to define the new crime against humanity
as follows: “Causing severe damage to cultural heritage.” 177
The proposed specific elements of the crime are: 1) the perpetrator
caused severe damage to cultural heritage; 2) the perpetrator was aware
of the factual circumstances that established the status of the heritage

173. See Gottlieb, supra note 118, at 870 n.59 (detailing the status protecting
cultural property was acknowledged in a UNESCO 2003 declaration).
174. Intangible Heritage Convention, supra note 133, art. 2 (defining
“intangible cultural heritage” as “the practices, representations,
expressions, knowledge, skills . . . . that communities, groups and, in some
cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage.”); Cultural
Diversity Convention, supra note 70, art. 4(3) (“‘Cultural expressions’ are
those expressions that result from the creativity of individuals, groups and
societies, and that have cultural content.”).
175. See Gerstenblith, supra note 41, at 392 (“Cultural heritage destruction
constitutes a crime against people, not simply a loss of property.”);
Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou
Bensouda at the Opening of the Confirmation of Charges Hearing in the
Case Against Mr Ahmad Al-Faqi Al Mahdi, Iɴᴛ’ʟ Cʀɪᴍ. Cᴛ. (Mar. 1,
2016), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otpstat-01-03-16 [https://perma.cc/C5QZ-G9VR] (“Let us be clear: what is
at stake is not just walls and stones. The destroyed mausoleums were
important, from a religious point of view, from an historical point of view,
and from an identity point of view.”).
176. If the proposal is adopted and a new crime against humanity is introduced
in the Draft Convention, it would also be recommended to introduce the
new crime in the Rome Statute. See Gottlieb, supra note 118, at 881 (the
“Rome Statute . . . . strives to represent the most comprehensive approach
. . . . [and] ought to serve as the normative platform for the inclusion of
new crimes”).
177. Id. at 889–90.
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targeted and intended that heritage to be severely damaged
nonetheless. 178
With regard to the elements of the crime, the following points are
noteworthy.
A.

The ‘Chapeau’ Elements

The new proposed crime must meet the three overall requirements
contained in art. 2 of the Draft Convention: Firstly, the acts must be
committed as part of a ‘widespread or systematic’ attack. This would
generally exclude isolated or sporadic misbehavior, however heinous
and revolting, from the scope of crimes against humanity. 179 The attacks
may occur in different locations and over a large geographical area, yet
this is not required. 180 Consequently, both acts of destruction of cultural
heritage in a single town (e.g. Timbuktu) or in various locations (e.g.
different sites across Syria and Iraq) may meet this requirement. As
indicated by jurisprudence of international tribunals, the term
‘systematic’ would usually connote an organized plan or policy. 181 The
authority behind the crimes may also be a non-state actor. 182 Thus, a
religious edict such as the fatwa issued by the Taliban in February
2001, instructing the destruction of cultural heritage in Afghanistan,183
may evidence the existence of an organizational plan or policy for the
purpose of meeting the requirement of a ‘systematic attack’. 184
Secondly, the illegal conduct must be committed as part of an
attack ‘directed against any civilian population.’ The expression
‘directed against’ specifies that “in the context of a crime against
178. See id. at 884.
179. Cassesse, supra note 31, at 356–57. But see Draft Convention, supra note
12, at 34 (indicating that an “attack may be widespread due to the
cumulative effect of multiple inhumane acts or the result of a single
inhumane act of great magnitude.”); id. at 32–33 (noting in its
commentary that “a single act committed by an individual perpetrator
can constitute a crime against humanity if it occurs within the context of
a broader campaign”).
180. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 34 n. 68.
181. Id. at 34.
182. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 121, at 162.
183. Jean-Christophe Peuch, Afghanistan: Taliban Edict Threatens Central
Asian Cultural Heritage, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 1,
2001) https://www.rferl.org/a/1095862.html [https://perma.cc/29H5HRXF] (ordering the elimination of all non-Islamic statues and
sanctuaries from Afghanistan).
184. See Newton & Scharf, supra 41, at 273 (discussing the widespread or
systematic requirement and mentioning in that regard the 1998 Fatwa
issued by Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders declaring their objective
to kill Americans and their allies).
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humanity the civilian population is the primary object of the attack.”185
This, however, does not render that only conducts targeting the
physical well-being of humans are criminalized. Rather, the expression
should be construed broadly to also include acts such as destruction of
property (cultural or other) that cause severe harm to civilian
population. That interpretation is consistent with the case-law
regarding the crime of persecution, as well as with the general goal of
Article 2 to protect “humanity” and not only “humans.” 186 The
reference to any civilian population also calls for a broad interpretation:
The term civilian should be understood as including persons of any
nationality. 187 With the exception of the crime of persecution, there is
also no need to demonstrate a discriminatory intent; it suffices that a
multiplicity of victims exists. 188 It is therefore submitted that the phrase
‘any civilian population’ may include not only an identifiable group
such as the residents of a town (e.g. those of Timbuktu) or members of
a religious groups (e.g. Buddhists around the world affected by the
destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas) but also more generally the
international community as a whole. The ICC’s recognition of the fact
that the international community may be considered as a victim further
supports this interpretation.
Thirdly, the perpetrator must have had ‘knowledge of the attack.’
This requirement constitutes an additional mental element to be
distinguished from the specific mens rea requirement of each crime. It
entails that the perpetrator must commit the acts with knowledge of
the broader widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population.
It is unnecessary, however, to prove that “the perpetrator had
knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of
the plan or policy of the State or organization.” 189 Furthermore, the
personal motive of the perpetrator for taking part in the attack is
185. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment, ¶ 421 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).
186. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7; Draft Convention, supra note 12,
art. 2.
187. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 121, at 174–75 (explaining that “crimes against
humanity cover a broader range of potential victims than war crimes”
and “it is unnecessary to demonstrate that the victims are linked to any
particular side in the attack against the civilian population”). See also
Cassesse, supra note 31, at 354 (explaining that “any civilian population”
means “any group of civilians whatever their nationality”).
188. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 121, at 173.
189. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, 6 (2011),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf;
See
also
Draft
Convention, supra note 12, at 42.
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irrelevant; the perpetrator does not need to share the purpose or goal
of the broader attack. 190 Thus, in relation to deliberate attacks against
cultural heritage such as those witnessed in Afghanistan, Syria, and
Mali, there would be no need to establish that a defendant who was a
member of the groups that committed the attacks had profound
understanding of the religious edict that served as a basis for the
widespread destruction or was privy to the detailed plans of the attacks;
it would suffice to establish that the individual concerned was aware
that his or her conduct was part of a general campaign targeting
cultural heritage.
B.

The Specific Material Element

An important distinction between war crimes and crimes against
humanity is that the former may criminalize certain conduct regardless
of their outcome. 191 In contrast, crimes against humanity as currently
listed under the Rome Statute and the Draft Convention require, as
part of the material element, damage or harm to be inflicted (through
extermination, enslavement, sexual violence, etc.). 192 Furthermore, the
nature of the crimes listed in Article 2 of the Draft Convention renders
that the harm inflicted is to be severe. 193 Hence, the new proposed crime
will also require actual and acute damage, although it is not required
that the damage caused be total or irreversible.
C.

The Specific Mental Element

The specific mental elements of the new proposed crime against
humanity, namely the awareness of the factual circumstances that
established the status of the target (protected cultural heritage) and
the intention to severely damage it, are consistent with the approach

190. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 43.
191. Id. at 7 (criminalizing the act of intentionally directing an attack against
protected property such as historic monuments in arts. 8)(2)(b)(iv) &
(ix); causing damage to the targeted property is not required.)
192. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7; see Draft Convention, supra note 12,
at 13. But see id. at 14 (outlining a general exception to that requirement
is found in the criminalization of an attempt to commit a crime against
humanity; hence, a fruitless attack may be considered as an attempt to
cause destruction of cultural heritage that yields individual criminal
responsibility).
193. Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 28 (“imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law”); id. (“other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health”); id. at 29 (“‘persecution’ means the
intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to
international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”)
(emphasis added).
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found in several existing crimes against humanity. 194 The requirement
to show intent also corresponds to international instruments governing
the field of cultural heritage. 195 The knowledge and intent could be
inferred from evidence such as the deliberate attack on a heritage site
carrying a protective emblem. 196
In exceptional circumstances, a governmental or organizational
policy that deliberately fails to take actions may be considered an
attack amounting to a crime against humanity, although the existence
of such a policy “cannot be inferred solely from the absence of
governmental or organizational action.’ 197 Accordingly, neglecting a
historic monument or an archeological site is unlikely to yield criminal
responsibility under the Draft Convention. Conversely, if governmental
officials purposely ignore ongoing attacks against protected heritage
while possessing the means to be aware of these attacks and the ability
to take appropriate steps to prevent the attacks and punish the
perpetrators, they may be held responsible for their inaction. 198

194. Draft Convention, supra note 12, art. 2(1)(e)t 28 (criminalizing
“[i]mprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation
of fundamental rules of international law.”) The elements of the crime as
defined in relation to the corresponding crime under the Rome Statute
require the perpetrator to be aware of the factual circumstances that
established the gravity of the conduct. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 189, at 6.
195. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8 (the war crime of attacking cultural
heritage such as historic monuments, requires the prosecutor to show that
the perpetrator “intentionally directed an attack” against the protected
heritage); See also 1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 15 (enumerating the
offences considered as serious violations of the Protocol, and which refers
to offences committed “intentionally”); G.A. Res. 46/49 (Aug. 6, 1992)
(using the phrase “intentional destruction,” defined by the Declaration as
“an act intended to destroy in whole or in part cultural heritage . . . .”);
1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 6 (imposing on State Parties the
duty not to take deliberate measures which might damage cultural
heritage in another state) (emphasis added).
196. For example, in Prosecutor v. Strugar, the intent to deliberately destroy
cultural property—the required mens rea for convictions under Article
3(d) of the ICTY Statute, which is similar to the mental element of the
proposed new crime against humanity—was inferred from: (1) the
evidence of the deliberate attack on the Old Town of Dubrovnik; (2) the
renown cultural and historical character of that property as a UNESCO
World Heritage Site; and (3) the fact that protective UNESCO emblems
were visible to the attackers of the property. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case
No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 329 (Jan. 31, 2005).
197. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS
189, at 6, n.6.

OF

CRIMES, supra note

198. ROY S. LEE & HAKAN FRIMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 76 (2001).
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D.

Definition of ‘Cultural Heritage’

If a new crime against humanity is added in the Draft Convention,
it would be recommended to also introduce a definition of the term
‘cultural heritage’ for the purposes of the Draft Convention. This would
correspond to the structure of Article 2 of the Draft Convention (and
similarly of Article 7 of the Rome Statute), which include definitions of
key terms of crimes. 199 In addition, as a newly introduced crime it would
be advisable to provide as much precision as possible.
The task of defining ‘cultural heritage’, however, is not without
challenges. The definitions of ‘cultural heritage’ and ‘cultural property’
are complex, having evolved over the years and differing from one
contemporary legal source to another. 200 Different methodologies have
been used in different legal instruments. Thus, for example, crimes
reflecting IHL norms such as those introduced as war crimes in the
Rome Statute, do not make any reference to the terms ‘cultural
heritage’ or ‘cultural property’. 201 Moreover, they are often based on
the purpose of the protected immovable property (e.g. “buildings
dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes” 202) rather
than on its cultural value.
A different methodology is reflected in the Cambodian
Extraordinary Chambers Statute, which neither provided its own
definition of the crime nor of the term ‘cultural heritage’; instead, it
included in the list of crimes subject to the Chambers’ jurisdiction the
crime of destruction of cultural property during armed conflict pursuant
to the 1954 Hague Convention. 203 A similar approach was applied in
199. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(2); Draft Convention, supra note
12, art. 2(2).
200. A different definition of cultural property or heritage is found in several
major international Conventions regulating that field, including the 1954
Convention, the 1970 Convention, and the 1972 Convention. See 1954
Convention, supra note 24, art.1; 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 8;
1970 Convention, supra note 35, art. 1.
201. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8.
202. 1907 Convention, supra note 117, art. 27. See also Rome Statute, supra
note 13, art. 8(b)(ix).
203. Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea, “The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers
Statute,” art. 7 (“The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to
bring to trial all Suspects most responsible for the destruction of cultural
property during armed conflict pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention
for Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, and
which were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January
1979.”). Limiting jurisdiction to destruction carried out in violation of the
1954 Convention may pose difficulties to the prosecution if acts of
destruction committed by the Khmer Rouge regime would not be
considered as being committed during an armed conflict. Agreement
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the more recent Nicosia Convention, which, in relation to moveable
property, borrowed the definition of ‘cultural property’ from the 1970
Convention. 204 While this definition is rather detailed and as such can
provide clarity, it also has its shortcomings. It covers only tangible
heritage and as a closed-list definition it does not allow for the inclusion
of forms or types of cultural heritage that are currently unknown or not
yet considered worthy of protection. In addition, for the purpose of the
1970 and Nicosia Conventions, the granting of protected status entirely
depends on its designation as protected heritage by States, 205 thereby
excluding heritage that has not yet been expressly designated as such.
One method which may provide the utmost clarity is to cover in
the definition introduced in the Draft Convention only cultural heritage
that has been listed in accordance with the mechanisms of existing
conventions in the field. This will include world heritage recognized
under the 1972 Convention and the 2003 Intangible Heritage
Convention, as well as cultural heritage listed as benefitting from
special protection under the 1954 Convention or enhanced protection
under the 1999 Protocol. 206
There are, however, inherent difficulties associated with those lists.
Similarly to the abovementioned point on the definitions of the 1970
and the Nicosia Conventions, the process of listing is completely
dependent on States’ willingness to propose certain cultural heritage for
inscription on the lists. Moreover, the current lists do not truly reflect
cultural diversity. For example, with regard to the World Heritage List
of the 1972 Convention, it has been contended that the List manifests
a bias in favor of some regions, notably Europe, the great prehistoric
civilizations of Latin America, and a number of Asian cultures, in
particular those of India and China. Cultural heritage of other regions
such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean scarcely figure on the
Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 7, U.N.-Camb., June 6,
2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117.
204. Nicosia Convention, supra note 36, art. 2(b). With regard to immovable
property, the Nicosia Convention used the classification of the 1972
Convention, namely monuments, groups of buildings, and sites. See 1972
Convention, supra note 71, art. 1.
205. See 1970 Convention, supra note 35, art. 1 (requiring the protected
property to be “specifically designated” by State Parties); 1972
Convention, supra note 71, art. 2 (requiring the protected moveable
property to be “classified, defined or specifically designated by any Party
to this Convention or to the 1970 UNESCO Convention,” and protecting
immovable property to be “defined or specifically designated by any Party
to this Convention or to the 1970 Convention”).
206. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 6(3); Intangible Heritage
Convention, supra note 133, art. 3; 1954 Convention, supra note 24, art.
8; 1999 Protocol, supra note 24, art. 15.
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List. 207 Additionally, certain types of cultural property are
disproportionately represented on the List, in particular European
historic towns, Christian places of worship, and archaeological sites
(especially those of ancient Greece and Rome). 208 It is also noteworthy
that the 1972 Convention explicitly indicates that non-inscription of
sites on the World Heritage List does not mean that they do not have
an outstanding universal value worthy of protection. 209 The Bamiyan
Buddhas and the Old Bridge of Mostar are just two examples of sites
that were not listed, at the time of their destruction, on the World
Heritage List, but would have likely met the ‘outstanding universal
value’ test of the 1972 Convention. 210
In light of the above mentioned considerations, it is proposed to
introduce a definition which meets the following conditions: Firstly, the
definition ought to be broad enough to include various forms of existing
and potential future types of cultural heritage. 211 Hence, it is
recommended to phrase the definition in general terms, preferably with
several illustrative examples in the commentary to the Draft
Convention, rather than to lay out an exhaustive list of types of
207. Raechel Anglin, The World Heritage List: Bridging the Cultural Property
Nationalism-Internationalism Divide, 20 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 241, 251
n.58 (2008).
208. Sophie Starrenburg, Who is the Victim of Cultural Heritage Destruction?
The Reparations Order in the Case of the Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi
Al Mahdi, BLOG OF THE EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L L. (Aug. 25, 2017)
https://www.ejiltalk.org/who-is-the-victim-of-cultural-heritagedestruction-the-reparations-order-in-the-case-of-the-prosecutor-v-ahmadal-faqi-al-mahdi/ [https://perma.cc/4V5X-KHLZ] (“[T]he listing process
at UNESCO has been viewed as notoriously politicised and biased towards
particular forms of heritage. The World Heritage List is by no means a
perfect mirror of the most important cultural sites across the globe, and
should be acknowledged as a work in progress.”).
209. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 12 (“The fact that a property has
not been included in either of the [World Heritage List or the list of World
Heritage in Danger] shall in no way be construed to mean that it does not
have an outstanding universal value for purposes other than those
resulting from inclusion in these lists.”) 2003 UNESCO Declaration, supra
note 69, §§ VI, VII (addressing intentional destruction of cultural heritage
of great importance for humanity “whether or not it is inscribed on a list
maintained by UNESCO or another international organization”).
210. World Heritage List, Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of
the Bamiyan Valley, UNESCO, https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/208/
[https://perma.cc/S29E-MW75]; World Heritage List, Old Bridge Area of
the Old City of Mostar, UNESCO, https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/946/
[https://perma.cc/DP7U-WC6Q].
211. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, Cultural
Rights, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/71/317 (Aug. 9, 2016) (noting that the concepts
of cultural property and cultural heritage “should be understood in broad,
holistic terms”).
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heritage as was done in the 1970 Convention.212 Further, for the reasons
previously noted, the definition should not be contingent upon listing
under existing conventions or on explicit designation by States. Such
listing or designation can certainly support a court’s assessment of the
cultural value of the heritage targeted, the defendant’s mens rea at the
time of the attack, or the aggravating factors for the purpose of
sentencing. Thus, for example, if the heritage targeted was listed at the
time of the attack under the 1972 Convention, it should be presumed
to fall within the definition of ‘cultural heritage’; yet, listing should not
a prerequisite for prosecution under the Draft Convention.
It is also recommended to include intangible heritage within the
definition to ensure the protection of a variety of important cultural
forms such as oral traditions, performing arts, and social rituals. 213 This
will not only reflect developments that occurred in recent decades such
as the conclusion of the Intangible Heritage and the Cultural Diversity
Conventions, but would also serve as a step towards the harmonization
of the different legal regimes currently governing intangible and
tangible cultural heritage, a prominent objective advocated for by
UNESCO. 214
The test for determining cultural heritage as such ought to be based
on the cultural value test, which is applied - although with variations in the definitions of cultural heritage or cultural property found in
several international conventions. 215 It provides better protection than

212. 1970 Convention, supra note 35, art. 1.
213. See Intangible Heritage Convention, supra note 133, art. 2 (providing a
definition of intangible cultural heritage).
214. For example, at 2004 a symposium entitled “Safeguarding of Tangible and
Intangible Cultural Heritage: Toward an Integrated Approach,” the thenDirector-General of UNESCO, Koichiro Matsuura, highlighted the need
“to pay attention to the totality of cultural heritage of nations and
communities so that protection measures are not only adapted to each
component but also mutually supportive where possible.” In that regard,
he added, the development of cooperation between the two major
UNESCO Conventions dealing with the protection and safeguarding of
the tangible and intangible heritage will be of outmost importance. He
reiterated, “the need for the harmonization of definitions and for the
development of a consistent set of heritage policies,” and concluded his
remarks by stating that “a new, inclusive and, where appropriate, unified
vision of heritage” and “an integrated approach, which respects the
diversity of cultures and which acknowledges the interdependencies of
tangible and intangible heritages as well as their autonomy, will have to
be studied and translated into concrete measures of implementation.”
Safeguarding of Tangible and Intangible Cultural Heritage: Toward an
Integrated
Approach,
UNESCO
(Oct.
20,
2004)
https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/89 [https://perma.cc/5ZP9-3WPS]
215. See 1954 Convention, supra note 24, art.1 (defining cultural property as
“movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural
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the “purpose test” of the 1907 Convention and the Rome Statute, since
it does not depend on the specific purpose for which protected objects
and sites were used at the time they were attacked. 216 The cultural
value test also rises above - and thus avoids - other general or legal
characterizations of heritage – e.g. its use for secular or religious
purposes - which are irrelevant for the sake of protection.
With regard to the threshold to be defined by the cultural value
test it is proposed to use the terminology of the 1954 Convention,
namely to set the bar at the level of heritage of ‘great importance to
every people’. 217 This will ensure consistency with the applicable test
under IHL and will provide sufficient protection to various forms of
cultural heritage whose value transcends geographical boundaries,218
while excluding those whose value is disputable.
Based on the discussion thus far, the proposed definition of the
term ‘cultural heritage’ will read as follows: “Human-made creation219
of great importance to every people, irrespective of its origin, ownership
or the purposes for which it is used, its territorial or geographical
location, its tangible or intangible nature, or whether it is movable or
immovable.” 220

VI. Conclusion
Since the genesis of the concept of crimes against humanity, the
crimes as defined under international law focused not on the single
criminal act against the direct victim, but rather on the repercussions
heritage of every people”); 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 1
(referring to heritage as “outstanding universal value”).
216. 1907 Convention, supra note 117, art. 27. See also Rome Statute, supra
note 13, art. 8(b)(ix).
217. 1954 Convention, supra note 24, art. 1.
218. See Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 91 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004); Brammertz et al.,
supra note 21, at 1153; Wangkeo, supra note 4 at 188 (explaining the
distinction between heritage that transcends geographical boundaries, on
the one hand, and national patrimony on the other hand).
219. The reference to “human-made creation” is meant to distinguish between
cultural and natural heritage. Though both deserve protection – as
manifested by the 1972 Convention which covers both types of heritage –
there have been few, if any, acts committed against natural heritage in
an “iconoclastic” manner, namely for the sake of destroying natural sites
as such and convey a message within the act of destruction. Addressing
acts committed against cultural heritage therefore appears to be more
acute. 1972 Convention, supra note 71, art. 4. This does not exclude any
future debate on criminalization of environmental wrongs as a distinct
crime against humanity, as suggested by Wattad. See generally Wattad,
supra note 59.
220. Gottlieb, supra note 118, at 895.
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of such acts on humankind. The preamble of the Draft Convention and
similarly that of the Rome Statute reflect this approach by making a
reference to crimes “that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.” 221
Cultural heritage is an integral component of humanity. As
numerous statements pronounced on the international level have
manifested, deliberate attacks against heritage have direct and lasting
impact on the world community as a whole. Beyond those statements,
various developments in recent decades – notably, since the 1990’s when
the Rome Statute was negotiated - attest to the growing recognition of
the importance of preserving heritage for present and future
generations.
The current legal regime under ICL, however, has not followed suit.
Introducing a distinct crime against humanity in the Draft Convention
can bridge this gap and enhance the rule of law by countering
radicalization and assist in preventing irreversible damage to the shared
heritage of humanity.
Considering that attacks against cultural heritage have already
been recognized as serious crimes under international law, albeit, as
explained in this article, with certain shortcomings, adding a new crime
against humanity should not be perceived as a groundbreaking
departure from the established framework of ICL. To the contrary, it
would be a natural continuation of the developments in this field,
indeed one which is overdue.

221. Draft Convention, supra note 12, preamble; Rome Statute, supra note 13,
preamble,
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